WARING v. MEDICAL SOCIETY.

RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

Superior Court, Bastern _District of Georgia.
STATE OF GEORGIA Ex RELATIONE JAMES J. WARING v.
THE GEORGIA MEDICAL SOCIETY.1
Membership of a club which is purely'literary or social or scientific, and does
not own property, cannot be considered a right of property; nor is the right of
meeting the other members a vested right of which courts can take cognisance.
Mandamus is not the proper form of remedy for a member of such a club who is
expelled.

THE relator filed his petition in the Superior Court of Chatham
county, alleging that the respondent, The Georgia Medical Society,
had deprived him of his privileges as a member of that body, by
an attempt at his expulsion, for causes which he alleged to be
insufficient in law, and in a manner not in accordance with law.
The facts appeared to be that the relator being a member of
the defendant society was charged substantially, 1. With having
"forfeited his position as a gentleman of respectable social standing," in that he had become surety on the bond of one White, a
person of color, elected clerk of the court in opposition to the
wishes of the entire respectable community, and then under
indictment for larceny, thereby facilitating the qualification for
office of a disreputable person, and also in that he had become
surety on the bonds of various persons of color charged with riot,
thus upholding persons of dangerous character; 2dly. With having "conducted himself in such manner as would render him
ineligible to membership," setting forth the same acts as above
charged, with others of which he was found guiltless.
The constitution of the society provided that "the resident
members of this society shall be composed of regular graduates of
medicine, and shall be gentlemen of respectable social position."
A by-law of the society also provided that:"Any member who shall be guilty of ungentlemanly conduct during the
session of the society, or who shall conduct himself, out of the society, in
such a manner as would render him ineligible to membership, shall be
expelled from the society according to the wishes of two-thirds of the members of the society present: Provided, that in every instance specific charges
I We are indebted for this case to John H. Thomas, Esq., of Savannah.-Es.
Am. L. R.
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be set forth and handed to the individual at least one month before the
society take action thereon."

Notice of the foregoing charges was duly given to relator, and
at'a subsequent meeting of the society he was tried and adjudged
guilty, the relator objecting to the proceedings as against law.
A vote was then taken to expel relator but was defeated, and a
resolution passed that he be censured by the president. The
relator, on being requested, came to the meeting, and the president
was proceeding to censure him when he arose and objected and
then left the room, but returned in a few minutes and stated that
he would receive the censure. A resolution was then passed
requesting him to resign, which he declined to do. At a regular
meeting of the society on. October 14th 1868, a resolution was
passed reciting the principal facts, and also that the relator had
at two previous meetings behaved discourteously to the society,
and in such a manner as would render him ineligible to membership, and that at the next regular meeting in November the society
would vote upon expelling him. Of this the relator had due
notice one month previous to the November meeting, and at this
meeting he was expelled by a vote of two-thirds of the members
present. The relator was not present at this meeting but made a
written communication stating that he was unable to attend by
reason of severe indisposition, disclaiming any intentional discourtesy to the society, and protesting against any proceedings on
the resolution sent to him, as unlawful and unjust.
Hartridgeand Chisholm, for relator, cited the following authorities: 1 Black. Com. 471, 476, 481; 2 Johns. Chan. R. 335; 6
Conn. 544; 4 Wheat. 657, 674, 699; 20 Pick. 495; 1 S. & R.
254; 2 Id. 141; 6 Conn. 532; 5 Watts 152; 10 Wend. 293;
1 Cowen 423; 12 John. 414; 2 Binney 448; 1 Strange 1051;
1 Cranch 168; 2 Esp. N. P. 682; 2 Burr. 723, 731, 738, 1045;
3- Id. 1265, 1267; 4 Id. 2186; 1 Id. 538; .2 L. Raym. 1564 ; 4
Geo. 44, 117; 2 Esp. N. P. 317-8; 2 Esp. R. 677; 1 Strange
557; 6 S. & R. 469; 4 Bac. Ab. 507; 12 Geo. 178; 26 Id.
665, 676; 2 Esp. N. P. 677, n. 3; Const. of Georgia, §§ 3, 9,
10; 10 Mod. 76; Cowp. 503; 2 Burr. 731; 6 S. & R. 476;
Angel & Ames on Corp., chap. xii., §§ 408, 409; 2 Kent's Com.
298; 1 Sumner 801; 2 Term R. 181; 4"Bac. Ab. 500; 2
Selw. N. P. 1083, n.; 2 Black. Com.21, 37; 3 Term R. 651;
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3 East 188; 81 Geo. 206; 8 Term R. 352; 1 Black. Com. 4460; 1 Bish. Crim. Law, §§ 55, 58, 114; Eden on Pen. Laws 309;
Tapp. on Man. 119, 201, 358, 374, 392-4; Angel & A. on Corp.
597, 683, 711; T. U. P. Charl. (Ga.) 235; Grant on Corp.;
Willcock on Mun. Corp. 150; Code of Georgia, §§ 1679, 3142,
4227, 712; 2 Barn. & Ald. 620; 5 Id. 899.
Thos. -E. loyd, and Jackson, Lawton & Basinger, for respondent, cited the following authorities: Code of Georgia,
§ 1416-1424; 14 Gee. 888, 9; Ang. & Ames on Corp. 3, 602;
7 Eng. Com. L. 295; 1 Sumner 284, 299; Code of Georgia,
§§ 1671-2, 3, 3143-4; Ang. & Am. on Corp. 615; 26 Gee. 675;
1 Keb. 84; Carthew 92; 2 Shower 191; Tapp. on Man. 69, 70,
145-6; 2 Black. Com. 266; 2 Term R. 352-6; 2 Kent's Com.
294; Black. Com. 471; 1 Kent's Com. 297; 3 Wend. 476; 2
Binney 148; 5 Burr. 2761; 1 Black. 25-58; 23 Eng. Com. L.
66, 71; Code of Georgia, § 3706; 7 East 353; 36 Gee. 461;
1 Sumner 284, 299; 2 Kent's Com. 304; 2 Term R. 182, 356;
Ang. & Am. on Corp. 602; 2 Term R. 177; 2 Cowp. 523; 7
Eng. Com. L. 245; Code of Georgia, § 3145; 1 Mod. 82; 4
Burr. 2186; Tapp. on Man. 137, 138, 216; 7 Term R. 3.91; 4
Gee. 26; Code of Georgia, § 3142.
SCHLEY, J.-This cause came on to be heard, and after elaborate argument the court is called upon to decide the legal points
made, which are to control ultimately this case; and after analyzing its merits, I have resolved it into two questions.
The first is, had or has Dr. James J. Waring any vested rights.
as a member of The Georgia Medical Society? And, second, if
he had or has, is mandamus the proper remedy for the enforcement of his rights?
The only rights which the relator can have, as a member of the
society, are either, first, a right to property; second, a riglht to
membership, with a view to the improvement of the science of
medicine; third, a right to practice his profession and collect his
fees; or, fourth, a right to meet the members of said society on
social equality.
In reference to the first right, to wit, the right to property, it
may be well to look to the charter to ascertain what the object of
this society is. It is clearly not to acquire property. No right
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is given to the society by the charter to buy or sell. It can
only receive bequests or donations. And even these it cannot
take for any individual benefit, but only for the promotion of the
purposes of the society. And what are they ? The lessening of
fatality and the improvement of the science of medicine. Can
any physician purchase any right in or to the society ? Can he
sell any right he as a member of the society may have? Can he
convey to another his right by will or deed ? Or, if he die, will
his rights descend or go to his legal or personal representatives ?
Clearly not. If, then, no member has any right which he can
buy or sell, or bequeath or transmit, can his right in any sense
be said to be property ? I think not.
If, then, the'relator had no property in the sense referred to,
let us turn to the second supposed right and see if it can be a
vested right, to wit :-the right to improve the science of medicine. This is one of the objects of the society, and it may be
said that membership is necessary to its accomplishment. But it
is only necessary to ask the question, can this, in any possible
sense, be a vested right, to have the response in the negative.
The relator's right to accomplish that benevolent end can neither
be increased nor diminished in or out of the society. This question, it seems to me, will not bear discussion.
But, thirdly, has the relator's right to charge or collect fees as
a practitioner been taken away by his expulsion from the society ?
He neither acquired this right in entering the society, nor lost it
on his expulsion. He had it before, and he has it now unimpaired.
Fourtdy. Was the relator's right to meet the other members
of the society in social intercourse, or even in professional intercourse, a vested right? It is true that while a member of the
society he had the right to enter the society, to join in the deliberations of that body, and to do all acts incidental to its object and
designs, but can this, in any sense, be called a.vested right? A
member of the Georgia Historical Society, for instance, so long
as he deports himself in compliance with the rules established for
its government and purposes, has the right to meet that body and
take part in its deliberations, but it will hardly be suggested that
such a right is so vested in him, as that he cannot forfeit it short
of the commission of a crime. Each of these 'societies is eminently of a social nature; and social standing, good character,
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respect of its members, harmony of action, and brotherly kindness, are essential to the accomplishment of the objects of both;
and it seems just as reasonable and right that each should be
vested with the power to rid itself of an objectionable member, as
that either should have the right to prevent a disreputable character from acquiring membership.
But suppose the relator has a vested right in either of the four
ways suggested (and I can conceive of no other possible right he
or any member of this society can have), can all or any of such
rights be enforced by the writ of mandamus? If he has a vested
right in property, he can enforce that by a common-law process.
His interest, if property, is ascertainable and can be recovered.
But can the writ of mandamus compel the members of the Georgia
Medical Society to return any or all of the other three supposed
rights? I think not. We have already seen that the relator's
right to practice his profession and collect his fees exists independent of his connection with the Georgia Medical Society; and it is
not necessary, therefore, to discuss that question. But as to the
third and fourtit possible rights, it is to be observed that they, in
my judgment, are not within the scope of the operation of the
writ of mandamus. They are eminently and exclusively social,
not to say ethical, or if you please vesthetical questions. The
court might order The Georgia Medical Society to receive the
relator into free membership, and yet as to these two rights of
membership, to wit, social meeting and promoting the benevolent
objects of the society, the court has no power to enforce its mandate. Suppose the members of the society refuse to meet with
the relator, refuse to discuss medical science with him, refuse to
consult with him, refuse to exert any effort, physical or mental, to
carry out the purposes of the society, what power of compulsion
has this court which it can bring to bear on such recusant members ? The bare question shows its impracticability.
I must, therefore, refuse the mandamus.
The result arrived at in the foregoing
case appears, so far as we gather from
the facts reported, to be substantially
correct, but the decision can hardly be
supported on the reasoning of the opinion,
No case that we have seen has gone
so far, as to say that rights of member-

ship, even in a merely literary or social
club, are not vested rights which the
law will. protect, and many cases have
laid down with great stringency, rules
which must govern the exercise of even
the most unlimited discretion as to expulsion of members from societies.
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The early English decisions, beginning with the famous case of James
Bayg, reported by Lord CoxE, 11 Rep.
93, were cases of amotion or disfranchisement in public or municipal corporations. In Bagg's Case, it was resolved by the Court of King's Bench
that the power of disfranchisement could
only be exercised under authority given
by express words in the charter, or by
prescription ; and where no such express
authority existed, there must be a conviction of some offence in a court of law
before the offender could be disfranchised.
As corporations however grew'more
numerous, and their character and purposes essentially changed, it was found
that this limitation of power was too
narrow to meet the cases then arising,
and in what may be called the second
leading case on the subjdcta, Rex v.
Richardson, I Burr. 517, it was decided
that a corporation may make a by-law
giving power of amotion for just cause,
though the corporation that made it had
no p6wer of amotion expressly given
by charter or claimed by prescription.
Lord MANSFIELD in

delivering judg-

ment said: "There are three sorts of
offences for which an officer or corporator may be discharged :I1. Such as have no immediate relation to his office, but are themselves of so
infamous a nature as to render the
offender unfit to execute any public
franchisq.
" 2. Such as are only against his oath
and the duty of his office as a corporator;
and amount to breaches of the tacit condition annexed to his franchise or office.
113. Offences of a mixed nature-as
being an offence not only against the
duty of his office, but also a matter indictable at the common law."
The
power of amotion, therefore, he said,
was incident to every corporation, though
the manner in which it should be exer-

cised might differ according to the distinction made in offences. For the first
class of offences a corporator can only
be amoved after conviction in a court of
law; but for the second sort, the power
of trial as well as removal is incident to
every corporation.
The reasoning and authority of Lord
MANSFIELD, in Rex v. Richardson, have
been followed with great uniformity in
subsequent cases both in England and
America, though the courts have shown
a strong tendency to restrict the exercise
of the power of expulsion for causes of
the second class to cases of acts directly
and unequivocally against the very purpose and existence of the corporation.
The leading American case is Commonwealth v. President of St. PatrickBenevolent Society, 2 Binn. 441 (1810). The
society was a charitable corporation, for
the purpose of raising funds to assist its
members in sickness, &c. By the charter it was authorized to make rules and
by-laws, and to do everything needful
for the good government and support of
the corporation.
A by-law chacted,
that "vilifying any of its members"
should be a crime against the society,
and might be punished by expulsion.
The relator was expelled for this offence.
The proceedings were regular, and the
case turned on the validity of the by-law.
The court, by TILGIMAN, C. J., held
the by-law void, on the ground that private quarrels of members were totally
unconnected with the purposes of the
society, and such a by-law therefore was
not necessary for its good government
and support, and awarded a peremptory
mandamus to restore the relator.
It is very clear that the character of

an act considered as an offence of the
second class enumerated by Lord MANSFIELD, depends materially on the nature
and purpose of the corporation itself.
Money corporations properly so called,,
that is corporations whose primary object
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is the acquisition of property or profit
for its members, stand on a very different
basis from those in which profit to individual members has no part, and in
which acquisition of property in the corporation itself is merely incidental to
its real purposes and objects. In the
former, it is conceded that the power of
expulsion can only be exercised under
express authority derived from the
charter: Angell & Ames on Corp.
H 113, 410. But, even in the latter
class, the courts have uniformly treated
nmembership as a vested right which they
would protect from illegal or irregular
interference. Thus, in Fuller v. Trustees of PlainfieldAcademy, 6 Conn. 532,
it was held that the place of a trustee in
an eleemosynary corporation, though no
emoluments are attached to it, is yet a
franchise of such nature that a person
improperly dispossessed of it is entitled
to redress, and a peremptory mandamus
was awarded. So in People ex rel. Gray
v. MedicalSociety of Erie, 24 Barb. 570.
The medical society established a feebill, and provided by a by-law that any
member taking a smaller fee than the
one prescribed in the fee-bill might be
expelled. The society had by statute
the right to make by-laws regulating
the admission and expulsion of members. The relator was expelled by the
society for violation of the fee-bill, and
on mandamus the court ordered him
restored, on the ground that the by-law
was not one within the proper powers
of the society.
To the same effect are the numerous
cases cited by the counsel for the relator
in the principal case, and also Evans v.
The Philadelphia Club, 14 Wright (50
Penn.) 107, a very interesting case,
which was argued with great earnestness
by very able counsel on both sides.
The decision being unfortunately by a
divided court, with no reasons assigned,
has not the authority to which it would
otherwise be entitled.

The course of reasoning, therefore, by
which the learned judge in the principal
case refines away the rights of the relator, cannot be considered as supported
by authority, nor can the denial of the
remedy by mandamus. It was decided
by Lord MAN-sriED in Rex v. Barker,
3 Burr. 1265, that mandamus is the proper remedy, and this has been uniformly
followed both in England and America.
The result of the adjudicated cases on
the subject of amotion and disfranchisement, would seem to reduce the power
of expulsion within very narrow limits.
Social clubs, however, being of very recent origin, and scientific or literary
societies having a social basis and character having of late grown into importance, it must be expected that the
cases arising hereafter in reference to
such societies cannot be fairly brought
within the stringent rules in regard to
expulsion of members, which have been
found just and satisfactory hitherto. As
the change in times and manners from
Lord Coun to Lord MixsirxnLD led the
King's Bench to the distinctions taken
between Bagg's Case and Rex v. Richardson, so the changes of the last century must bring the courts to a more
liberal application of the principles of
the latter case.
The true and solid ground on which
to decide such cases is, as it seems to us,
the contract of membership, liberally
construed with reference to the purposes of the corporation or society. The
classification of Lord Miwssr.LD is
sufficiently comprehensive. "Secondly," he says, "1such as are against the
duty of his office as a corporator; and
amount to breaches of the tacit condition
annexed to his franchise." Whether an"
act be such a breach or not should be
judged entirely by its effect on the society; and if by his assent to the laws
and rules of the society, a member has
agreed that the corporation, or any part
of it, shall be the tribunal to decide the
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fact, then the courts instead of being
astute to discover defects of jurisdiction
(as it must be confessed they have in
many of the American cases), should
aim liberally to support the judgment of
the tribunal agreed upon.
In the latest English case on this subject, Hopkinson v. Marquis of Exeter,
Law Rep. 5 Eq. 63, the complainant
being a member of the Conservative Club,
had given pledge that he would vote for
certain liberal candidates at the parliamentary election, and for this he was
expelled from the club. The rules of
the club made no reference to the political opinions of its members, except so
far as they were implied from its name.
Lord RomILTY, Al. It., refused to restore the complainant, on the ground
that he had submitted to the jurisdiction
of the club by becoming a member, and
the proceedings had been regular according to the by-laws. A club, he said,
was a partnership, but of a different kind
from any other; and the members had
by i'ules constituted a tribunal for the
decision of questions of membership and
expulsion. "The question is, whether
there is any appeal from that decision.

It is clear that every member has contracted to abide by that rule which gives
an absolute discretion to two-thirds of
the members present to expel any member. Such discretion, like that referred
to by Lord ELDON in Vhite v. Damon,
7 Yes. 35, must not be a capricious or
arbitrary discretion. But if the decision
has been arrived at bond fide, without
any caprice or improper motive, then it
is a judicial opinion from which there is
no appeal."
It does not appear from the report
whether the club was incorporated or
not; but, putting the decision fairly on
the contract of the member to abide by
the judgment of the tribunal established
by the by-laws, we are unable to perceive that the fact of incorporation is at
all material.
If the decision in the principal case
had been rested on the by-law quoted,
and the regularity of proceedings under
it, we think it would have stood on a
basis of sound reason, and have been
strictly within the principle of Lord
MANSFIELD'S judgment in Rex v. Richardson.
J. T. i.

Court of Appeals of Mar yland.
NORTHERN CENTRAL RAILWAY CO. v. CANTON CO.'
Trade fixtures and buildings for trade, no matter how strongly attached to the
soil or firmly embedded in it, are treated as personal property, and as such subject
to removal by the person erecting them.
The road-bed of a railway, the rails fastened to it, and the buildings at the
depots are real property; but under certain circumstances they may be trade fixtures, and be treated as personal property.
The ground upon which a tenant's right to remove his fixtures has been limited
during the continuance of his term, rests upon the doctrine, that if he neglected to
avail himself of his right within this period, the law presumed that lie voluntarily
' We are indebted for the opinion in this case to the Baltimore Law Transcript.-EDs. AM. L. R.
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relinquished his claim in favor of the landlord. This presumption cannot arise,
where the term, being uncertain in its continuance, may be terminated suddenly,
and without previous notice.

THE Northern Central Railway Company, after the year 1855,
and before 1859, constructed, at its sole cost and charge, a railway
track upon the lands of the Canton Company, with the license and
permission of the latter. In 1859 the appellee revoked the license
under which the appellant was in possession of its land. This was
followed, in 1860, by two suits, one an action of ejectment, and
the other of trespass quare clausumfregit. During the pendency
of these suits, which had been referred, by agreement, to an arbitrator, the appellant filed a bill for specific performance, and also
praying for an injunction. The appellee was successful in having
the bill dismissed, and recovered judgment in both actions at law.
A subsequent action of ejectment was brought in January 1865,
for the road bed, which had not been embraced in the previous
ejectment.suit. A judgment thereon was obtained in June following, and under a writ of habere facias possession was delivered to
the appellee in October of the same year. The rails and other
materials which formed a part of the railway constructed by the
appellant under the circumstances above stated, were upon the
land at the time, and the question arises who is the rightful owner
of them.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
BRENT, J.-The fact that the rails had been taken up and
severed from the soil -shortly before the execution of the writ of
possession is immaterial. If the appellant had no title to them
while attached as a railway to the soil, the severance did not
confer any.
The general rule of the common law certainly is, that whatever
is fixed and annexed to the soil, becomes a part of it, and cannot
be removed except by him who is entitled to the inheritance. But
this rule is by no means inflexible and without exception. Trade
fixtures have been held by the earliest cases, in which the question
arose, to form an exception, no matter how strongly attached to
the soil or firmly embedded in it, they are treated as personal property, and as such subject to removal by the person erecting them.
In the leading case of .-Mwes v. Mawe, 3 East 38, 2 Smith's L.
C. 251, the earlier and more important decisions upon this subject
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are very fully reviewed by Lord ELLENBOROUGH1, and his conclusion from them, that trade fixtures and buildings for trade have
always been recognised as an allowed exception to the general
rule, has been acquiesced in, without an exception, as correctly
stating the law. The distinction which he makes against fixtures
for agricultural purposes has been doubted, and regarded as too
nice and technical, but there is no case in which the exception has
not been held to apply to trade fixtures. In Van Ness v. Pacard,
2 Peters 137, the exception is recognised by the Supreme Court of
the United States, STORY, J., delivering the opinion, and the doctrine applied to a house, which had been erected as an accessory
to the business of a dairyman, although it was occupied as the
residence of his family, and those employed by him. It is also
recognised and asserted in Holmes v. Tremper, 20 John. R. 29;
White's Appeal, 10 Barr 252, and authorities there cited.
Another exception to the general rule is that of structures
upon the land of another, which have been erected by the builder
at his own cost and for his own exclusive use as disconnected with
the use of the land. If so erected with the knowledge and assent
of the owner of the land, the title remains in the builder, and the
property is held by him as a personal chattel. Thus it is not so
much the character of the structure as the circumstances under
which it was erected, that will determine whether it passes with
the realty, or is to be treated as personal property.. -In the notes
to the cases of -Princev. Case, and Beric v. Kern, 2 Amer. L.
0. 747, it is correctly said the American courts "have repeatedly
held that a house or other building will not be merged in the land
on which it stands in consequence of the solidity of its structure,
or the connection between it and its foundations; if the agreement
of the parties, and the purposes of justice require, that the title
to both should be kept separate, and that the owner of the house
should have the right to enter for the purpose of using it as his
own, .or removing it." In the case of Dame v. -Dame, 38 N. H.
429, this doctrine was applied to a house erected upon the land of
another, and it was held to be but a personal chattel. It is also
established by airtissv. Hoyt, 19 Conn. Rep. 154; Wells v. Bannister, 4 Mass. 514; Barnes v. Barnes, 6 Verm. 388; Pem6erton
v. King, 2 Devereux 376, and being personalty, it is governed by
the same rules as any other personal property lefE by the consent
of the owner of other land upon his premises: SmitA v. Benson,
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1 Hill 176. We consider the property in dispute in this case, as
coming within both of these exceptions. The railway of which
it formed an important and necessary part, cannot rationally be
supposed to have been designed for any other purpose than that
of trade connected with the ordinary business and pursuits of a
railway company. It certainly was not accessory to the enjoyment of the freehold, or in any manner necessary and convenient
for the occupation of the land by the party entitled to the inheritance. Had it been voluntarily abandoned, it is not pretended
that it would, or could have been used by the appellee as a railway. The conclusion cannot be avoided, that it was built by the
appellant with a view and for the purpose of facilitating and
increasing the business and trade in which the corporators, under
their corporate powers, had embarked as carriers. A railway is
certainly quite as essential to the trade and business of a railway
company as a steam-engine and the house which may cover it, or
any other fixture can be to the miller or the miner. We do not
mean to be understood as denying the doctrine laid down in The
Farmers'Loan and Trust Co. v. Hendrickson, 25 Barb. 484, and
cited with approval in 18 Md. 193, that the road-bed of a railway,
the rails fastened to it, and the buildings at the depots are real
property; primdfacie a house, with its foundation planted in the
soil, is real property; yet when it is accessory to trade and in law
a trade fixture, we find all the authorities regard it as personal
property. The same doctrine is applicable to the railway in question. As a general rule, it would be regarded as real property,
but under the circumstances of this case, coming as it does within
the definition of a trade fixture, it becomes personalty, liable to
the same rules of law that govern any other personal property.
All the surrounding circumstances show that at the time this
railway was laid upon the land of the appellee, it was not intended
that it should be merged in the freehold. It was built at the sole
cost of the appellant, with its money and labor, under the reasonable belief that it had a free right of way, and under the license
and by the permission of the owner of the soil. It is true this
license was not of such a character as made it irrevocable, or gave
the appellant any sufficient standing in a court of equity, to obtain
a decree for a specific performance, yet it was a license justifying
an entry, and whatever was done under it, before its revocation,
is to be regarded as legal, and not as the act of a trespasser. The
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road thus laid must have been intended by both parties for the
exclusive use of the railway company, and that use could not have
been fully enjoyed without the right to hold and control it. The
appellant could not otherwise have directed its management, and
taken up and replaced such rails or other materials as were
necessary in its judgment for the repairs and proper condition of
the road.
The strict rule, which has been applied to tenants requiring
them to remove fixtures which they hold as personal property,
during the term, even if it was adopted by this court, does not
apply to the present case. The ground upon which a tenant's
right to remove his fixtures has been limited during the continuance of his term, rests upon the doctrine that if he neglected to
avail himself of his right within this period, the law presumed
that he voluntarily relinquished his claim in favor of the landlord.
This presumption cannot arise where the term, being uncertain in
its continuance, may be terminated suddenly, and without previous
notice. To apply it to a party in possession under a license revocable at pleasure, would be manifestly unjust and without reason.
It would be allowing a party, without any fault of his own, or any
opportunity of removal, to be deprived of his property at the
mere will and caprice of another.
If the property replevied did not belong to the appellee at the
time the license to the appellant to be upon its land was revoked,
it is not perceived how the subsequent suits between them could
have changed the title to it. This property was not the subject
of those suits. They had reference to the land only upon which
it was, and determined no question of its ownership, inasmuch as
it does not pass with the realty from the single circumstance of
having been affixed to the soil.
Upon a careful review of the law and facts in this case,
we cannot agree with the court below. We think the property in question belonged to the appellant, and the judgment below should be
reversed.
Judgment reversed, and judgment for the appellant for
the property replevied, and one cent damages and
costs.
The foregoing decision affords another compensation for their own errors. The
instance of the ingenious but rather dis- true and manly course, unquestionably,
ingenuous devices of courts, in making would have been to hold the license to
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use the land for railway purposes, after
it had been executed by laying a track,
as irrevocable, on the same grounds
that oral contracts for the sale of land
have been enforced in courts of equity.
But there has been a great deal of ingenious refinement to escape from any
such sensible and natural course. Afid
the latest one is, that while any one who
stands by and allows another to build
upon his own land, to the obstruction of
any incorporeal right of the person thus
acquiescing, he will be precluded from
thereafter interposing any obstacle to
the use and continuance of such obstruction ; that no such consequence follows even an express license to build on
the land of another by the owner: Dyer
v. Sanford, 9 Met. 395, and cases cited.
We know there is a great deal of
learning expended to show the distinction between allowing such license to
operate upon corporeal and incorporeal
interests in land, and how the one is
more in conflict with the Statute of
Frauds than the other. But the truth is,
that both are in direct conflict with that
statute, and so is a decree of specific
performance on the ground of part-performance. But if fraud will justify a
court of equity in denying the perpetrator the shield of an express'statute in
one case, it certainly will in all cases.
And the refusal to extend it to all analogous cases, as is done in making this
distinction between licenses executed
upon the land of the licensor and that
of the licensee, is without any just
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foundation, or ground to stand upon.
And the same rule has been extended
to a license executed on the land of a
third party, which was held irrevocable:
Curtis v. Xoonan, 10 Allen 406. The
distinction is here made between acquiring and abandoningan easement in
land; that the one cannot be done by oral
license, but the other may be. But the
distinction is rather thin and shadowy.
An existing easement in land can only
be regarded as an interest in the realty,
and of equal importance only with one
of equal extent to be thereafter created.
The former cannot be abandoned by the
owner without passing to some other, not
perhaps as a distinct easement, but as an
interest in the land. The absolute owner
of land is no more affected in his title
by the creation of an easement in the
land, than he is by the destruction of the
same easement thereafter; so that it
is allowing ourselves to be cheated by a
very thin disguise to affect to believe,
that the creation of an easement in land
by parol, is any more in conflict with
the Statute of Frauds than its abandonment.
And the calling a railway a temporary
fixture for the purposes of trade, is better than no redress in so palpable a
wrong as the present case presents; but,
after all, it is curing one blunder by
another scarcely less flagrant. But we
admit it is better than no remedy. We
would go back and find where the train
first left the track, and there apply the
cure.
aI.
F. R.
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Supreme Court of lowa.
HAWLEY v. HUNT.
State insolvent laws have no extra-territorial operation: and a creditor cannot
be compelled by a state of which he is not a citizen or resident to become a party
to insolvent proceedings therein; and such proceedings cannot discharge a debt

due to a non-resident creditor, unless he voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction by
becoming a party to the proceedings, or claiming a dividend thereunder.
A non-resident and non-assenting creditor is not bqund by a debtor's discharge
under state insolvent laws, no matter where the debt originated, or is made payable : citizenship of the parties governs, and not the place where the contract was
made or where it is to be performed.
This rule applies to a case where 'a non-resident creditor has recovered judgment
against his debtor in the state where the latter resides ; and also to the case where
the judgment has been assigned to a non-resident creditor and notice given to the
debtor, before the latter commenced proceedings to obtain his discharge.
The history of the Federal and state adjudications on the subject of the effect
of discharges under state insolvent laws, examined by DILLO , C. J.

from Jackson District Court.
The plaintiff sued on two judgments rendered against the defendant in New York. The defence relied on was a discharge of
the defendant under the insolvent law of that state.
In 1854, two judgments were rendered against the defendant
in the Supreme Court of New York. The defendant was at that
time a resident and citizen of that state. Those judgments (as
would appear from copies of the complaints), were rendered upon
promissory notes executed by the defendant respectively to one
Pierce (who assigned the note to one Rulsion), and to one Thomas.
Where the notes were executed did not otherwise appear than by
averment in the complaints in the actions in New York, that one
of the notes was executed at "Denmark," and the other at
"Gouverneur," but in'what state was not alleged. Of what state
Rulsion and Thomas, who recovered the judgments in New York
.against the defendant, were citizens, did not appear.
In 1856, the defendant removed from New York and became a
resident of Iowa, and was a resident of Iowa at the time of the
commencement of the present action, and at the time the judgment therein was rendered in his favor, from which the plaintiff
prosecutes the present appeal. In 1860, one of the judgments
obtained in New York against the defendant was assigned by the
APPEAL
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judgment-plaintiff to Hawley, the plaintiff in the present action,
then and now a resident and citizen of Iowa.
In 1861, the other judgment was likewise assigned to Hawley.
In 1862, Hawley commenced the present action on the abovementioned judgments against the defendant in the District Court
of Jackson county, Iowa (defendant being a resident of that
county), and obtained personal service of process upon him. Defendant appeared, and in March 1862, filed an answer, admitting
the rendition of judgment against him in New York as alleged,
and pleaded payment, &c. The cause was continued from time to
time, until, in March 1865, an amended answer was filed, in which
the defendant alleged that "on the 3d day of August 1863, he
was duly discharged from all his debts under the statute of the
state of New York, providing for the discharge of insolvents."
A copy of the discharge was annexed to the answer. The certificate of discharge was dated on the 3d day of August 1863,
and the officer, after reciting the proceedings, declares that "he
does hereby discharge the said insolvent from all his debts and
from imprisonment, pursuant to the provisions of the statute."
The foregoing facts were uncontroverted. On the trial the
plaintiff maintained that the defendant was not a resident of New
York at the time he applied for and obtained a discharge under
the insolvent law of that state. This the defendant denied, and
on this issue both parties introduced evidence.
A jury was waived and the cause tried by the court, which gave
judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff appealed.
. Hf. Dunbar,for appellant.
W. E. Leffingwell, for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
DILLON, C. J.-Respecting the validity of discharges under
state insolvent laws, where the creditor is a non-resident of the
state granting the discharge, there has been much discussion,
much conflict of view, and, until quite recently, on some points
much doubt.
But in view of the authoritative adjudications of the Supreme
Court of the United States, presently to be referred to, and of
the leading decisions of the state courts, cited below, the law, so

HAWLEY r. HUNT.

far as relates to the present case, may be stated in a single

sentence.
The settled doctrine now is, that a debt attends the person of
the creditor, no matter in what state the debt originated or is
made payable; that a creditor cannot be compelled by a state of
which he is not a citizen or resident, to become a party to insolvent
proceedings therein; that such proceedings are judicial in their
nature, so that jurisdiction over the person of the creditor is
essential; that notice is requisite to jurisdiction in such cases,
and can no more be given in insolvent proceedings than in personal actions where the party to be notified resides out of the
state, and hence a discharge under a state insolvent law will not
and cannot discharge a debt due to a citizen of another state,
unless the latter appears and voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the court by becoming a party to the proceeding, or claiming a dividend thereunder.
As direct authority for this statement of the law, we refer to the
following decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States:
Baldwin v. HYale, 1 Wallace 223, 1863; s. c. 3 Am. Law Reg.
(N. S.) 462, and note by Judge REDFIELD; Ogden v. Saunders,
12 Wheat. 213; Boyle v. Zacharie, 6 Pet. 348 ; Cook v. llKoffat,
5 How. 310; Suydam et al. v. Broadnax, 14 Pet. 75.
See also the following cases and authorities: Donnelly v. Corbett, 7 N. Y. (3 Seld.) 500; Relch v. Bug6ee, 48 Maine 9; s. c. 9
Am. Law Reg. (0. S.) 104; Beers v. Rhea, 5 Texas 349; Poe v.
Duck, 5 Md. 1; Anderson v. Wheeler, 25 Conn. 603; Crow v.
Coons, 27 Mo. 512; Pugh v. Bussel, 2 Blackf. 394; Beer v.
Hlooper, 32 Miss. 246; Woodhull v. Wagner, Baldw. C. C. Rep.
300; Byrd v. Badger, 1 MeAll. 263; Springer v. Foster, 2
Story 387; 2 Story Const., § 1390; Confl: Laws, § 341; 2
Kent Com. (9 ed.) 503; Kelly v. Drury, 9 Allen 27, 1864.
I have said that the settled law now is, that a non-resident and
non-assenting creditor is not bound by the. debtor's discharge
under state insolvent laws, no matter where the debt originated
or is made payable. In other words, the citizenship of the parties
governs, and not theplace where the contract was made, or where
it is to be performed.
It is perhaps desirable to trace briefly the lin of decision leading to and establishing the doctrine as above stated.
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Respecting state insolvent laws the controlling constitutional
provision is, that "no state shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts."
"Any law," to use the language of Mr. Webster, in his argument in Ogden v. Saunders, 6 Webs. Works 26, impairs the obligation of a contract which dischargesthe obligation withoutfuViling it."
In Sturgis v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122, the Supreme Court
of the United States held such laws to be invalid as to pre-existing
contracts. Subsequently the great case of Ogden v. Saunders,
12 Wheat. 213, came before the court. Respecting just what
that case decided there has been much difference of opinion; but
these differences have been set at rest by the later decision in
Baldwin v. Hale, before cited.
In Ogden v. Saunders, one point ruled or declared was, that a
state insolvent law or bankrupt law was not a law impairing the
obligation of contracts as respects debts contracted after the
enactment of such law. This was upon the ground, largely if
not wholly, that every contract made in a state must be taken to
have relation to the existing law of the state which becomes, so
to speak, a part of it, attached to it and attendant upon it; and
since the insolvent law declares a right on the part of the debtor
to be discharged from contracts thereafter made on certain terms,
whoever becomes interested in such contracts takes them subject
to this right, and the exercise of such right cannot be said to impair the obligation of the contract. It was, this point in the case
which has been the cause of much controversy in the state courts.
In his. argument, Mr. Webster combated with great force the
proposition " that the law itself was part of the contract, and
therefore cannot impair it:" 6 vol. Webs. Works, 29.
At present we have no occasion to enter upon a discussion of
this vexed proposition-the Supreme Court asserted that a state
bankrupt law was not invalid as respects subsequent contracts.
And the point ruled in Ogden v. Saunders,was that a state insolvent law cannot affect the rights of creditors who are citizens of
other states.
The second opinion of Mr. Justice JOHNSo (12 Wheat. 258),
says Judge CuRTIs (Digest, p. 114, § 4), was concurred in on the
general question and settled the law involved therein. (On this
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point see also, Boyle v. Zacharie, 6 Pet. 348, 643; Cook v. foffat,
5 How. 310; Baldwin v. Hale, supra, per CLIFFORD, J.)
The principle of the decision in Ogden v. Saunders, as stated
by Mr. Justice JOHNSON, is, "that as between citizens of the same

state, a discharge of a bankrupt by the laws of that state is valid
as it affects posterior contracts; as against citizens of other states,
it is invalid as to all contracts."
In Cook v. Aoffatt, 5 How. 309, the leading case of Ogden v.
Saunders was reviewed, the soundness of many of the reasons
assigned in former opinions questioned, but the court held, among
other points, that "a certificate of discharge under an insolvent
law will not bar an action brought by a citizen of another state
on a contract made with him;" that state insolvent laws "can
have no effect on contracts made before their enactment, or beyond
their territory." This language, it will be seen, is not free from
uncertainty, and does not necessarily exclude the notion if a contract is made originally between citizens of a state and is to be
performed there, and a non-resident subsequently becomes interested in or the owner. of such contract (for example, a bill of
exchange), he shall not be bound by a discharge granted in pursuance of a state law in existence at the time when the contract
was made. The Supreme Court of Massachusetts, admitting its
duty io follow what was decided on this subject by the Supreme
Court of the United States, held that even as between citizens of
different states, a state insolvent discharge was effectual in cases
where it appears by thq terms of the contrace that it was made and
to be performed in the state granting the discharge. This was in
Seribner v. Fisher,2 Gray 43, Mr. Justice METCALF dissenting.
This decision was followed in other cases in that state which,
without reargument, were rested upon it.
In Demeritt v. Exchange Bank, 10 Law Rep. 606 (March 1858),
Mr. Justice CURTIS, then of the Supreme Court of the United
States, in express terms denied the correctness of Scribner v.
Fisher, stating that it was in conflict with Ogden v. Saunders and
Boyle v. Zacharie. "It is urged," says Judge CURTIS, "that
where the contract is to be performed in the state it is not within
Ogden v. Saunders. It has been so held in Scribner v. Fisher, 2
Gray 43. But I cannot concur in that opinion. I consider the
settled rule to be that a state law cannot discharge or suspend the
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obligation of a contract, though made and to be performed within
the state, where it is a contract with a citizen of another state."
In Donnelly v. Corbett, 7 N. Y. (3Seld.) 500, 1852, the Court
of Appeals of New York; in Telch v. Bugyee, 48 Me. 9, s. C., 9
Am. Law Reg. (0. S.) 104, 1860, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Maine; in Anderson v. Wheeler, 25 Conn. 607, the Supreme
Court of Connecticut, and in Doe v. Puck, 5 Md. 1, the Supreme
Court of Maryland, and there are other similar decisions, decided
that the distinction taken in Scribner v. Fisherwas unsound, and
that state insolvent laws had no extra-territorial effect so as to
operate upon the rights of citizens of other states.
*But in Baldwin v. Bfale, before cited, the Supreme Court of
the United States, in 1863, in terms and by name declared Scribner v. Fisher to be in conflict with the settled rule of that court.
Mr. Justice CLIFFORD, after reviewing the prior decisions and
stating the points ruled, says: "But a majority of the court held
in Scribner y. Fisher that if the contract was to be performed in
the state where the discharge was obtained, it was a good defence
to an action on the contract, although the plaintiff was a citizen
of another state and had not in any manner become a party to the
proceedings. Irrespective of authority it would be difficult, if not
impossible, to sanction that doctrine. Insolvent systems of every
kind partake of the character of a judicial investigation. Parties
whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard, and in
order to be heard they must first be notified. Common justice
requires that no man shall be condemned without notice and an
opportunity to make his defence. Courts of one state have no
power to require citizens of other states to become parties to
insolvent proceedings. * * * Insolvent laws of one state cannot
discharge the contracts of citizens of other states, because they
have no extra-territorial operation, and consequently the tribunal
sitting under them, unless in cases where a citizen of such other
state voluntarily becomes a party to the proceeding, has no jurisdiction in the case. Legal notice cannot be given, and consequently there can be no obligation to appear, and, of course, there
can be no legal default."
Independent of its authoritative force, this decision and the
grounds upon which it is placed, command unqualified approval.
Certain it is, that it is the final and settled doctrine of the Supreme
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Court of the United States, with respect to a question of which
that tribunal is the ultimate arbiter.
Subsequently, the Supreme Court of massachusetts, in Kelly
v. Drury, 9 Allen 27, following the decision in Baldwh v. Hale,
itself overruled Seriner v. Fisher.
The Supreme Court of the United States having thus settled
that a citizen of another state cannot be affected by an insolvent
discharge in the state in which the debtor resides, even though
the contract was made and on its face is to be performed therein,
that principle settles this case, and shows that the judgment of
the District Court was erroneous on the undisputed facts before it.
Those facts were that the judgments sued on were rendered
against the defendant in New York; that he afterwards removed
to and became a citizen of Iowa; that both plaintiff and defendant were citizens of this state at the time when the judgments
were assigned to the plaintiff, at the time the latter brought suit,
and at the time the judgment was rendered which is now appealed
from.
The discharge was no bar to the plaintiff's action, even though
it be admitted that the defendant concluded to remain in New
York, and in good faith applied for this discharge as a citizen of
that state.
The assignment of the judgments to the plaintiff made him the
owner of them and of the debts of which they were the record
evidence. He was as much the owner as if they had been recovered in his name. Our statute recognises the plaintiff as the
owner, and allows him to sue thereon in his own name. The defendant had notice of the assignment. He owed the debt, and
owed it to the plaintiff. He could not afterwards pay to the
assignor, or to any person but the plaintiff.
Both .parties being citizens of Iowa, and the plaintiff having
actually brought suit in Iowa to collect his debt, the plaintiff,
though suing upon a New York judgment, was. an Iowa creditor,
and the defendant would have no more right, as against the plaintiff, subsequently and pending the action, to remove to New York,
acquire a discharge which should be valid as against the plaintiff's
action in Iowa, than if the defendant had never previously resided
in New York, or had while residing there made the contract with
the plaintiff at the time a resident of Iowa.
I need not stop to point out the injustice aid unreasonableness
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of holding that a debtor, pending an action against him, may
change his residence, obtain an ex parte discharge, resume his
residence in the state in which his creditor resides, and then be
allowed to plead such discharge as an effectual bar to the plaintiff's action.
The court of no state could, in justice to its citizens, ever give
its sanction to such a doctrine, unless it conceived that it was so
bound down by authority that it could not unloose itself from its
grasp.
The court below undoubtedly proceeded upon the idea of the
Supreme Court in Massachusetts in Scribner v. Fisher,and counsel
ufidoubtedly did not call its attention to the case of Baldwin v.
Hale, since it is not referred to in their briefs in this.court.
It was suggested on the argument that the court of New York
would have control over judgments rendered in that state, and that
the case was or might be different from what it would if the contracts on which the judgments were rendered had been transferred
to the plaintiff, a resident of Iowa, and had never been reduced
to judgment in New York.
The decisions in this court (Burtisv. Cook J-Sargeant, 16 Iowa
194) treat a judgment rendered as a chose in action. It is a debt,
or the record evidence of a debt. The plaintiff, as the assignee,
has .the same rights as if he had, while a citizen of Iowa, recovered judgment in his own name in New York. In that case it is
plain that it could not be discharged against his assent, by a state
insolvent proceeding. This suggestion comes right back to the
point before discussed and which has been finally set at rest by
Baldwin v. Hale, viz., that if the creditor is a n6n-resident of the
state a discharge under a state law cannot affect him unless he
voluntarily becomes a party to the proceeding, and this is the
case irrespective of where the contract was entered into or was to
be performed.
Place of making or place of performance is utterly immaterial
in all cases where the creditor is not a citizen of the state granting
the discharge. Citizenship of the parties, and not the place of
the making or the place fixed for the performance of the contract,
is the controlling element.
As the plaintiff was undoubtedly a citizen of Iowa at the time
the defendant obtained his discharge in New York, it is not necessary to decide the question, so warmly debated by counsel, whether

ROBINSON v. WEEKS.

the defendant did in fact acquire a residence in New York at the
time he applied for relief under its insolvent laws. To my mind
this is doubtful, but as the evidence is conflicting and by no means
decisive, we ought not on this ground to disturb the judgment of
his Honor below. This has made it necessary to dispose of the
case on the assumption that the defendant was not a citizen of
Iowa; but was a citizen of New York when he applied for his
.discharge.
Judgment reversed.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.
ELBRIDGE W. ROBINSON v. WARREN WEEKS.
The contracts of infants are:(1). Binding-when for necessaries at fair rates;
(2). Void-when manifestly and necessarily prejudicial ; and
(3). Voidable, at the infants' election, either during minority or within a reasonable time after attaining majority: including all executory agreements not for
necessaries, and all executed contracts of this sort wherein the other party can be
placed substantially in statu quo.
Mere receipts for money paid for stock in a petroleum company, being for no
appreciable value, need not be returned by a rescinding infant before the commencement of his action for the recovery of money thus paid.

ASSUMPSIT for money paid for stock inan oil company.
The plaintiff was born October 31st 1845. On March 3d, and
April 18th 1866, the plaintiff paid the defendant $200, and received therefor only two receipts, one signed by the defendant and
the other by the defendant's agent, of the following tenor: "Received of E. W. Robinson, one hundred dollars for one-half of
his share in the Mt. Vernon Land and Petroleum Co." On
November 12th 1866, the plaintiff repudiated the contract,
demanded of the defendant the money paid, and offered to assign
to him all interest he might have in the company; but did not
offer to return the receipts.
Kempton, for the plaintiff.
S. Belcher, for the defendant.
BARIROWS, J.-If the receipts which the defendant and his
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agent gave for the money which the plaintiff seeks t6 recover in
this action, could be considered as certificates of petroleum stock,
the action could not be maintained; for assuredly, if an infant
has received 'anything which may have an intrinsic or a market
value, by virtue of the contract which he claims to rescind, he
must return it, if it is in existence and within his control after he
becomes of age, before he can be permitted to reclaim the money
paid for it. It is unnecessary, in this case, to define more carefully or precisely the limitations of this obligation on the part of
a rescinding minor to return what he has received under the contract, or to consider further the effect of failure or inability to
return anything which has such a value; for the plaintiff was of
age and had the receipts in his possession when he claimed to
rescind, but did not offer to return them.
But these receipts were of no appreciable value to any one
except to the plaintiff' as evidence of the fact that he had paid his
money for the defendant's promise of a share in the Mt. Vernon
Land and Petroleum Company. He never received any certificate of stock. The receipts gave him no legal interest in the
company property if there was any. At most they gave him only
a right to call upon the defendant for a share of the stock; and
that right he renounced in writing as soon as he became of age,
coupling with his renunciation an offer to assign over to defendant
any interest which he might have in the company. The return
of the scraps of paper on which the receipts were written was,
under kuch circumstances, unnecessary.
The plaintiff was a minor when he made the agreement for the
stock and paid the money. Making known his election to rescind
the agreement and reclaim his money within a fortnight after he
became of age and before he had received anything by way of
consideration except these papers, he demands his- money and
brings this suit. Is there any good reason, upon principle or
authority, why he should not prevail ?
The defendant's position receives countenance from some passages in the text-books.
In Chitty on Contracts (6th Am. ed.) 154, we find the following: "An infant's right to elect whether he will avoid or confirm
a contract entered into by him during his infancy, does not necessarily entitle him to recover back money which he has paid thereon.
It is indeed a general rule that an infant cannot recover back
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money paid by him, even upon a contract which by reason of his
infancy he is not bound to complete, there being no imposition."
And Parsons lays it down very broadly, thus: "If an infant
advances money on a voidable contract which he afterwards
rescinds, he cannot recover the money back, because it is lost to
him by his own act, and the privilege of infancy does not extend
so far as to restore this money, unless it was obtained by fraud :"
1 Pars. on Contracts (ed. 1853) 268.
The origin of this doctrine is to be found in a dictum of Lord
MANSFIELD, ill
the celebrated case of The -Earlof Buckingham
v. Drury, 2 Eden 60. One of the questions in that case was
whether an infant could, by contract, bar her dower. When the
case came before the House of Lords upon appeal, the opinion
of Lord NORTHINGTON that the statute applied only to adults was
reversed, and Lord MANSFIELD, in delivering the opinion, said:
"If an infant pays money with his own hand without a valuable
consideration for it, he cannot get it back again." This doctrine
was quoted to support the decision in -Holmesv. Blog, 8 Taunt.
508. But it was uncalled for in that case, the pure doctrine of
which is that a minor cannot recover money paid on a valuable
consideration which he has partially enjoyed, when he cannot put
the other party in the same position as before; and in Corpe v.
Overton, 10 Bing. 252, while the decision in Holmes v. Blogg was
sustained, the dictum of Lord MANSFIELD, and the "strong
expressions" in the later case, were reviewed and substantially
overruled; and it was held that the plaintiff might recover back,
"in an action for money had and received, a sum which, while an
infant, he had paid in" advance towards the purchase of a share
in defendant's trade, to be forfeited if the purchase was not completed when it appeared that he, on arriving at the age of twentyona years, had refused to complete the purchase.
The dicta of the learned judges in The Earl of Buckingham
v. Drury, and Holmes v. Blogg, ubi supra, seem to, have been followed in McCoy v. Huffman, 8 Cowen 84; Weeks v. Leighton, 5
N. H. 343; and Harney v. Owen, 4 Blackf. 337; and thus far
they do not seem to have been eliminated from the text-books, but
they have been practically rejected not only in Corpe v. Overton,
above cited, but by many courts in cases where the question has
arisen whether an infant, who has engaged to labor for a certain
period, and after performing part of the work, has rescinded the
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contract, can recover for the work he has done. So that Parsons,
u i supra, while remarking that "the principle upon which the
rule is founded that forbids the infant's recovery of money advanced by him on a contract which he has rescinded, would appear
to lead to the conclusion that he could not recover for work done"
under such circumstances, admits that the weight of authority is
the other way. See Judkins v. Walker, 17 Maine 38; Noses v.
Stevens, 2 Pick. 332; Vent v. Osgood, 19 Id. 572; Thomas v.
lDike, 11 Verm. 273; Peters v. Lord, 18 Conn. 337; ledbury v.
Watrous (overruling McCoy v. ffuffman), 7 Hill 110; Whitmarsh
v. -Hall,3 Denio 375; Lufkin v. .ayall (overruling Weeks v.
Leighton), 5 Foster 82; Wheatley v. .Tiiscal, 5 Porter (Ind.) 142.
Thus it will be observed that all the principal cases where these
dicta have been followed, have been reconsidered and overruled
by the courts in which they were decided. It is true that in
Breed v. Judd et al., 1 Gray 455, the right of the minor to
rescind an executed contract was made to depend not upon the
character of the contract, but upon the finding of the jury, that
the consideration by him received was not only adequate but beneficial. That case is apparently in conflict with Tipper v. Cadwell,
12 Met. 559, which holds, we think rightly, that what subjects of
expenditure are to be termed beneficial to the infant is a matter
of law to be decided by the court.
We think the true doctrine is, that the contracts of minors may
be divided into three classes: (1) binding-if for necessaries at
fair and just rates; (2) void-if manifestly and necessarily prejudicial, as of suretyship, gift, naked release, appointment of agents,
confession of judgment, or the like; (3) voidable-at the election
of the minor, either during his minority, or within a reasonable
time after he becomes of age; and this last class includes all the
agreements of a minor, which may be beneficial (and are not for
necessaries), until fully executed on both sides,-and all executed
contracts of this sort where the other party can be placed substantially in statu quo. How far executed contracts where the
other party cannot be placed in as good a position as before must
be excepted, and the power of the minor to avoid them denied, it
is not necessary here to discuss.
The mere fact that the contract has been fully executed, or that
the infant has paid the money with his own hand, does not necessarily affect his right of rescission and recovery: Williams v.
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Brown, 34 Maine 594; Austin v. Gervas, Hobart 77; Price v.
Furman, 1 Williams (Vt.) 268.
The protection which the law supposes the infant to need is as
much required against the improvidence which has paid out, as
against that which only promises to pay; and where it can be
afforded without converting the shield into a sword, it should be
given. There seems to be no good reason why, if lands conveyed
and goods sold and delivered may be reclaimed by the infant,
money paid should not be.
In this case, the contract being legally rescinded, the rights of
the parties %re the same as if none had been made. He who
makes a contract of this class with a minor, assumes the risk of a
rescission. The money must be repaid with interest from the date
of its receipt.
Defendant defaulted.
KENT,

D]IcKERSON,

DANFORTH,

and

TAPLEY

JJ., concurred.
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An order of an inferior state court under the Act of Congress for the removal
of a cause to a United States court, is reviewable by the Supreme Court of the
state, and an appeal to such Supreme Court suspends the vesting of jurisdiction
of the case in the United States court until the determination of the appeal.
The Act of Congress provides for the removal of a cause before trial if an
action at law or before-final hearing, if a suit in equity, and after a judgment in
the inferior court it is too late to remove the cause, although the judgment may be
reversed by the Supreme Court of the state, and a new trial or hearing ordered.

THIs was an appeal from an order of the Dane Circuit Court, sending
the case to the United States Circuit Court for the District of Wisconsin.

The opinion of' the court was delivered by
PAINE, J.-The application for removal was made by the plaintiff
under the Act of Congress of March 2d 1867, and the appellant claims
that the order was erroneous upon two grounds: 1st. That the case was
not within the act; 2d. That if it were within it, the act itself, so far
as it professes to authorize a non-resident plaintiff who had commenced
his suit in the stats court to obtain removal, is invalid.
The respondents counsel have declined to argue either of these questions, but have contented themselves with simply submitting and briefly
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discussing the proposition that this court has no jurisdiction to hear and
determine this appeal. Of course, this question must be determined
upon the hypothesis that it is possible that the case may not have been
within the Act of Congress, and that even if within it, the act may
have been invalid. Counsel assume this possibility, for they say that
the appellant's remedy "(if indeed he has any) is to apply to the Federal court to remand the case to the state court."
In support of the position they refer to two classes of authorities. But
these wholly fail to sustain it, and in truth warrant directly the opposite
conclusion. And it would seem impossible to have drawn any such
inference from them, except by confounding the distinction between the
two classes, and applying the doctrines of both indiscriminately to each.
Thus they first refer to several cases, holding that where a'proper application for a removal is made, in a case where the party is entitled to a
removal by law, the jurisdiction of the state court ceases, and every subsequent step, except that of sending the case away, is coram non judice
and void. They next cite another class, holding that where the order
of removal was improperly made, in a case where the party was not
entitled to it, an application may be made to the Federal court to dismiss it for want of jurisdiction, and they then seek to transfer to the
latter class of cases the doctrines of the former, and to hold that the
jurisdiction of the state court ceases, and every step subsequent to the
application for removal is equally as unauthorized and void in those
cases where the order for removal is improper and the party not entitled
to it by law, as in the others.
Such a conclusion is in conflict with both classes of cases. Both proceed upon the express assumption that it is only when the removal is
authorized by law, and the application properly made, that the jurisdiction of the state court is divested, and that of the Federal court attaches.
Both proceed upon the assumption that where this is not the case, the
jurisdiction of the state court remains, and the Federal court acquires
none whatever. And yet we are now asked to hold, that although this
case may have been one of the latter class-though it may be one in
which there was no law authorizing a removal, and in which, consequently, the Federal court acquired no jurisdiction, yet that by some
unaccountable process the state court lost it, so that between the two
the jurisdiction has lapsed entirely. Such a conclusion would be extraordinary indeed, and it has as little support in authority as it has in
reason.
If there was no law authorizing the removal, and there was none if
either of the positions taken by the appellant is true, then the jurisdiction of the state court remained unimpaired, and there was no obstacle
in the way of its exercise except the erroneous order that the case be
removed. And the idea that the appellate power of the state court cannot be invoked to correct this error-that it remains in abeyance, suspended by such an unauthorized application, that the court which has
jurisdiction must decline to exercise it, until the court that has none shall
see fit to disclaim it-is one that cannot be supported upon any reasoning.
But if the right to appeal exists in a case where the removal is unauthorized, then it must, also exist even when the order of removal is
proper. The question whether the court has power to hear and deter-
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mine the appeal, cannot depend upon the conclusion to which it may
come on the merits of the order to be reviewed.
Nothing is better settled in legal practice, than that an order by which
a subordinate court dismisses a case for Want of jurisdiction, or in any
way'divests itself of jurisdiction, is subject to review on appeal. It is
within the express provision of our statute that allows an appeal from
any order which prevents a judgment from which an appeal might be I
taken. It is the common practice of all courts. The case of MAfayer v.
Cooper, 6 Wallace 247, cited by the respondent, is one where the
Supreme Court of the United States reviewed such an order, made by'
the United States Circuit Court. It is true in that case the order or
judgment of dismissal was reversed, the court holding that the Circuit
Court had jurisdiction. But if they had held differently, they would
have affirmed the order, and not have dismissed the writ of error. This
is the invariable practice. And this shows that the exercise of the
power to hear and determine an appeal from an order by which a subordinate court attempts to divest itself of jurisdiction, is not an assertion
of jurisdiction in the case subsequent to and in defiance of the application for removal. It is merely the decision upon that application itself.
And that decision, whether the power be exercised by a subordinate or
appellate court, is not the exercise of jurisdiction in the case. It is the
determination of an independent preliminary question, and one which
every court, from the necessity of the case, has the power to determine
whenever presented.
And whoever invokes the exercise of this power on the part of a subordinate tribunal of the state, must invoke it subject to all the conditions imposed upon that tribunal by the law of its existence, and one of
those conditions is that an order made upon such an application is
appealable.
That the power to hear and determine an appeal from such an order
is entirely independent of the question of jurisdictioi to proceed upon
the merits of the action, the case of Nelson v. Leland et al., 22 How.
U. S. 48, is an express authority. A motion was there made to dismiss
the appeal on the ground of a want of jurisdiction originally in the subordinate court, and the chief justice delivered the opinion of the court,
"that the question of jurisdiction in the lower court is a proper one for
appeal to this court, and for argument when the case is regularly reached,
and that this court have jurisdiction on such appeal." The motion was
.therefore denied, and upon the express ground that their jurisdiction of
the appeal was wholly independent of the actual jurisdiction of the lower
court, to try the action upon its merits. And if this is so, the exercise
of this appellate power is not the exercise of that jurisdiction of which
it is claimed the state court is divested by the presentation of a proper
application for removal. It is true that if the appellate court should
-sustain the jurisdiction of the state tribunals, they might proceed subsequently to attempt to exercise it' But the mere determination of the
question whether such jurisdiction had ceased or continued is not an
exercise of it, any more when made by the appellate than it was when
made by the subordinate court.
Indeed, the right and the duty of the state cou'rts to exercise such
appellate power has been expressly decided by the Supreme Court of the
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United States, in Xanouse v. ilfartin, 15 How. 198. The Court of Common Pleas in the City of New York had denied an application for
removal, and afterwards proceeded to try the action on the merits, and
rendered judgment. It was taken by appeal to the Superior Court,
which affirmed the judgment. And the Supreme Court of the United
States reversed that judgment, not on the ground that the Superior
Court erred in taking jurisdiction of the appeal, but in neglecting to
reverse the judgment of the Comnvn Pleas for refusing the application
for a removal. They say: "The error of the Superior Court was, therefore, an error occurringin the exercise of its Jurisdiction,by not giving
due effect to the Act of Congress under which the plaintiff in error
claimed," &c. And it made an order remanding the case to the Superior Court, with directions for further proceedings in conformity to the
opinion. And such further proceedings would consist wholly of an
exercise of the appellate power of the Superior Court to reverse the
judgment of the Common Pleas.
And yet we are referred to this case by the respondent's counsel to
support their assertion, that this court will "stultify itself by taking
jurisdiction of this appeal."
This court certainly is not oblivious of the fact, that if it should hold
that a removal of this suit was unauthorized, and should subsequently
proceed to render final judgment after such further trial as may be
necessary, the Supreme Court of the United States may assert its appellate jurisdiction over that judgment, may reverse it, and remand the
ease with directions similar to those in .Kanouse v. Martin, as counsel
suggest. But we feel very confident that if it should do so, it will not
be because this court erred in assuming jurisdiction of the appeal, but
because it will think this court erred in holding the plaintiff not entitled
to a removal.
I have thus endeavored to state the distinction between the exercise
of the powe'r to decide upon the application for a removal, whether by
the subordinate or appellate court, and the exercise of jurisdiction over
the merits of the action, for the purpose of showing that the broad lau
guage used~by the court in Gordon v. Longest, 16 Pet. 104, cannot in
any event be applicable to the exercise of such appellate power. But
it is perhaps doubtful whether the same language would be now used by
that court. The subsequent case of Kanouse v. .artin seems studiously
to avoid it, and makes no suggestion that the judgment of the Court of
Common Pleas, and of the Superior Court were void for want of jurisdiction, but speaks of them throughout the opinion as merely "1erroneous." And the same view is also supported by the ease of Hadley v.
Dunlap, 10 Ohio St. 1.
I come, therefore, to the conclusion that this order is appealable, and
that it is a duty of this court from which it cannot shrink to proceed to
a determination of the questions presented.
Was the case within the provisions of the Act of Congress? The
act provides that the non-resident party to a suit in a state court, between
a citizen of that state and a citizen of another state, shall be entitled to
a removal, on making the proper application, "1at any time before the
final hearing or trial of the suit.'! The question arises upon this language: Was the application here made "before the final hearing or
trial," in accordance with its intent and meaning?
VOL. XVILM-36
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What was its intent? I think it will not be claimed that the word
"final," as used in this provision, applies to or qualifies the word "trial."
The word "hearing" has an established meaning as applicable to equity
cases: It means the same thing in those cases that the word "trial"
does in cases at law; and the words "final hearing" have long been
used to designate the trial of an equity case upon the merits, as distinguished from the hearing of any preliminary questions arising in the
cause, and which are termed interlcutory. This use and meaning of
the words, is too well established and too familiar to require reference.
I assume, therefore, that the meaning of the statute is the same as
though these words were transposed, and it provided that the application might be made at any time "before trial or final hearing," and that
no implication can be raised by attempting to apply the word "final" to
the word "trial ;" that Congress intended to distinguish between those
trials which might only partially dispose of the case, and such as might
occur afterwards, and to allow this right of removal so long as any
question yet remained to be tried, in order to the complete disposition
of the suit. It will be observed that in the Act of 1866, of which this
is amendatory, the words were so transposed, and the application was
required to be made "before trial or final hearing;" and their transposition in the present statute was evidently merely casual, not designed to
effect, and not effecting any change whatever in their meaning. The
obvious intention of the .statute was to require the party desiring to
apply for a removal to do so before trial in actions at law, and, what is
the same thing, before final hearing in actions in equity. The reason
and justice of this, if a removal is to be allowed at all, are apparent.
0nly the non-resident can apply for it. And it would constitute the
very essence of injustice to give him the right to experiment upon the
decisions of the state tribunals, obtaining those which if in his favor
would be binding and conclusive upon the other party, but which if
against himself, he could repudiate and take his chances again in a new
tribunal. The statute did not intend to provide for any such wrong,
but on the contrary clearly designed to exclude the possibility of it, by
requiring the application to be made before trial or final hearing. It
seems clear, therefore, that whenever in any state court there has been
a trial in an action at law, or a final hearing in an action in equity, the
result of which was an adjudication, which upon the principles governing judicial decisions would be final between the parties, as to any portion of the merits of the action, the case has passed beyond the stage
when it was within either the letter or the spirit of the law.
How was it with this suit in that respect? It was an equitable action
br6ught in 1860 to foreclose a mortgage in the Circuit Court of Dane
county. The defendant, in accordance with the practice prevailing in this
state, interposed by way of defence certain counter claims, growing out of
and connected with the transactions in which the mortgage originated.
To these there was a demurrer by the plaintiff, which was overruled,
and the order overruling it was affirmed on appeal to this court. Various
proceedin s were subsequently had, and the ease was then brought to
final hearing, and a decree rendered in favor of the'defendant, dismissing the complaint. That was reversed on appeal to this court, and
another final hearing was had in which the plaintiff obtained a judg-
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ment. That was reversed by this court and the cause remanded for
further proceedings; and at that stage of it this application for a removal was made. It will be seen, therefore, that instead of being made
before final hearing, it was not made until after there had been two final
hearings. And it is no solecism to speak of two final hearings in an
equity case, any more than it is to speak of two trials in an action at
law.
It is material then to consider what was the effect of the several decisions of this court in respect to the rights of the parties as to the matters involved in them. No doctrine is better settled here than that the
matters decided become res adjudicata; those decisions became the law
of the case, binding upon the parties, binding on the subordinate court,
and disposing finally of the questions decided. Whatever further proceedings might be necessary to the ultimate disposition of the case,
those questions were no longer open: Luning v. The State, 1 Chand.
264; Parkerv. Pomeroy, 2 Wis. 112; Downer v. Cross, Id. 371; Cole
et al. v. Clark, 3 Id. 323; Jones v. Reed, 15 Id. 40.
If this rule were peculiar to this state, still the decisions of this court
would govern, as to the effect of our own judicial proceedings between
the parties. But the same rule jrevails everywhere; and it has been
asserted by the Supreme Court of the United States quite as strongly
as by any other tribunal. In Martin v. Hunter (Lessee), 1 Wheat. 304,
counsel raised a question as to the propriety of a former decision, the
case having already been before the court on a former writ of error. On
page 355, the court say: "In the next place, in ordinary cases, a second
writ of error has never been supposed to draw in question the propriety
of the first judgment, and it is difficult to perceive how such a proceeding could be sustained upon principle. A final judgment of this court
is supposed to be conclusive upon the rights which it decides, and no
statute has provided any process by which this court can revise its own
judgments. In several cases which have been formerly adjudged in
this court., the same point was argued by counsel and expressly overruled. It was solemnly held that a final judgment of this court was
conclusive upon the parties, and could not be re-examined." So it was
held that the same rule prevailed in equity, and that a second appeal to
that court, brought up only the propriety of the proceedings in the court
below, subsequent to the mandate on the first: Hopkins v. Lee, 6 Wheat.
113. In Exparte Sibbald, 12 Pet. 492, that court said, "a final decree
in chancery is as conclusive as a judgment at law. Both are conclusive
of the rights of the parties thereby adjudicated." See also Bridqe Co.
v. Stewart, 3 How. 413; Roberts v. Cooper, 20 Id. 480.
It appears, therefore, that by the principles universally recognised as
applicable to the effect of judicial proceedings, there had been several
trials of this case, both in the subordinate and appellate courts of this
state, and several judgments by the latter, which, so far as our judicial
system is concerned, were final and conclusive between the parties, as to
the questions decided.
It is true those judgments did not finally dispose of the case. But
that fact does not at all impeach their finality as to the matters disposed
of by them. There are few important cases but what are carried more
than once into the appellate courts. But the fact that the judgments
of those courts do not in the first instance completely dispose of the
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case, has never been supposed to annul their effect entirely, and to place
the case, when it got back into the subordinate court, precisely as it
would be if there had never been any trial or appeal whatever. On the
contrary, as the authorities above referred to fully show, when the case
gets back into the inferior court, it carries with it the judgment of the
superior as the established law of the case, and no questions are open to
further examination except those which that judgment has left open.
A trial or final hearing consists of the examination and determination
both of questions of fact and law. In equity cases the court may determine both. On appeal this court may determine both. But the
case may have been so presented that we could only properly determine
the questions of law, leaving a further trial upon a part or all of the
facts necessary for a complete adjustment of the controversy. This was
true in this suit. The struggle in the case was upon the questions of
law growing out of the defendant's counter claims. Those questions
were fully considered, and finally 'decided on the last appeal to this
court; and the case was remanded for such further trial upon the questions of fact, as was necessary to its final determination. And yet after
all these years of litigation, these repeated hearings and judgments both
of the subordinate and appellate courts -of this state, it is now claimed
that this application for a removal was made "before trial or final hearing." If such had been the intention of Congress, I cannot think it
would have stopped where it did. If it would set aside and destroy the
effect of repeated trials and judgments, why hesitate before the last one?
If it would intervene after all the most important questions in the case
.had been tried and passed into judgments, binding and conclusive on
the parties, why pause before the fact that some question, perhaps a
minbr and unimportant one, still remained to be tried, in order to a complete.disposition of the case? When tried, the judgment concerning it
could be no more final, no more binding, than the previous judgments
had been, as to matters involved in them. Hence, if they were to be
overthrown, why not overthrow the whole, and allow the party to remove
his case, and try it anew in a court of original jurisdiction, after it was
finally and wholly disposed of by the judgment of the state court?
There could be no greater objection to the justice of such a law, than
there is to it as it now stands, if it is to have the effect contended for.
If the effect of two trials and judgments in all the state courts was to
be annulled, there could be no reason why the same thing should not be
done as to three or any other number necessary to dispose of the case.
But the act furnishes no evidence of such intention. On the con-trary, both its letter and spirit exclude it. The law had formerly allowed
only non-resident defendants to apply for a reioval. And they were
required to be prompt, and to make their election at the outset, and
before taking any steps which could be construed into a voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the state court. This act designed to
extend the right to non-resident plaintiffs as well. It designed to extend
the time, so that the application might be made at any time before trial
or final hearing. But it did not design to go so far as to allow the party
actually to submit his case to the judgment of tile state court on the
merits, and then, if its judgment should be against him, but should not
happen to finally determine the case, to exercise his right of removal.
To induce a court of justice to infer a design to effect such an object, to

AKERLY v. VILAS.

borrow the language of Chief Justice MARSHALL, "the intention should
be expressed with irresistible clearness." But here, so far from that
being the case, Congress has explicitly required that the application
shall be made "before final hearing or trial." And the spirit and object
of the act unite with its letter, in conducting imperatively to the conclusion that its meaning was to require it to be made before the party had
voluntarily submitted his case to any trial or final hearing whatever in
the state court.
Nor is this conclusion at all impeached by the rule that has been
established by the Federal and other courts, under statutes authorizing
appeals or writs of error from final judgments or decrees. It is generally held there, that the decree or judgment must be one purporting a
full and final disposition of the case, and not on its face reserving a part
of itfor future decision by the court; yet, even in those cases, the rule
has not been held with unreasonable strictness, but those decrees which
substantially dispose of the merits of the controversy, are held final so
as to allow an appeal, although some matters essential to a complete execution of the decree are reserved for further examination and decree.
Thus, in Forgay v. Conrad, 6 How. U. S. 201, a decree was passed disposing of the general merits of the action, but directing an account of
rents and profits, and reserving that subject for further decree. A
motion was made to dismiss, on the ground that the decree was not final.
The court said: "The question upon the motion to dismiss is, whether
this is a final decree within the meaning of the Acts of Congress. Undoubtedly it is not final within the strict technical sense of that term. But
this court has not heretofore understood the words ' final decrees' in this
strict and technical sense, but has given'to them a more liberal, and, as
we think, a more reasonable construction, and one more consonant to the
intention of the legislature." See also Bronson v. Railroad,20 How.
524, 531. But even if under this class of statutes it were held that the
decree or judgment must be absolutely final to authorize an appeal, no
argument could be drawn from it by analogy against the conclusion
already arrived at. The difference in the objects of the two statutes
would at once furnish an answer. The one is designed to regulate the
exercise of an appellate jurisdiction, by which the judgments of an
inferior tribunal may be reviewed. It is natural in such case to require
tfie inferior court first to dispose, substantially at least, of the whole
case, before the appellate power could be invoked. But the object of
the other statute was not to provide for a review of the decisions of an
inferior tribunal, but for the exercise of an election by a party to a suit
in a state court, to transfer it to another court of original jurisdiction
for trial. The design was to authorize an election between the two;
not to give him a chance at both. And this object can only be accomplished by requiring, as the statute does, the application to be made
before any trial or final hearing in the case. The object of the one
statute was to prevent an appeal until everything had been decided.
The object of the other was to authorize a removal only before anything
had been decided.
It seems to me clear, therefore, that this case was not within the Act
of Congress, and that the order for removal was unauthorized. I am
aware that the learned judge of the District Court of the United States
for this district has reached a different conclusion. His opinion upon
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the subject is published in the American Law Register for April 1869.
Upon this point he says: "If the cause had been finally determined
by either judgment of the Circuit Court, or by order of the Supreme
Court; then the application for removal would not have been filed before
'the final hearing or trial.' But the last order of the Supreme Court
reversing the judgment of the Circuit Court, and remanding the cause
to that court for further proceedings according to law, opened the whole
case to litigation, the same as if no judgment had ever been rendered.
The Supreme Court in effect ordered a venire facias de novo, which required the Circuit Court to hear the cause as if no hearing or trial had
taken place."
If this is so, then this Court has been laboring under a great delusion. If, after a case has been three times in this court, twice on appeal
from final judgments in the court below, if after the essential vital legal
questions upon which its decision depends have been solemnly adjudicated by this court, and the cause remanded to the Circuit, it starts
there anew, with nothing settled, " i he whole case opened to litigation,
as if no judgment had ever been rendered," then are not only our labors
fruitless indeed, but those of the unfortunate litigants in the state
courts are vainer than the labors of Sisyphus.
We have not so understood the law. We have uniformly applied to
our decisions, so far as relates- to matters within our jurisdiction, the
same rule which the Supreme Court of the United States applies to its
decisions; and have held.that they become the law of the case, binding
on the parties and the subordinate courts, and that the questions decided
are not open to further litigation. We cannot have erred in this, unless
the decisions of this court constitute an exception to the rule by which
those of all other courts are governed.
I cannot but regret that this difference of opinion has arisen between
this court and the learned judge of the District Court. It may be the
cause of much embarrassment and expense to the parties. But inasmuch as the difference does exist, I know of no way to avoid its consequences, whatever they may be. There seems but one course open to
this court, consistent with-its duty to itself and to the state, when its
appellate power is invoked in the regular course of judicial proceedings,
and that is, to exercise the jurisdiction which it believes itself to possess,
according to its best judgment whether that be well or ill founded.
As the conclusion already arrived at makes it unnecessary, I shall not
enter upon the question whether it is conipetent for Congress to authorize a non-resident plaintiff who has voluntarily brought his suit in the
state court to obtain a removal. I will only say that there is a marked
difference between such a law and that which has heretofore been in
fore.
The appellate jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court over
the state courts has been sustained by the decisions of that court, and
generally acquiesced in. And the validity of the twelfth section of the
Judiciary Act, authorizing a non-resident defendant sued in a state
court to have the case removed for trial to the Federal courts, has also
been sustained as an alleged branch of the appellate power. But the
argument by which a proceeding apparently so incolgruous, as one by
which the courts of original jurisdiction in one judicial system wrench
a case bodily from the courts of original jurisdiction of another distinct
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judicial system created and organized under another constitution of
government, is attempted to be sustained, is not that there is any express
provision in the Constitution of the United States to that effect, but that
the proceeding is necessary in order to give effect to the general grants
of judicial power which it contains. It is said that as questions may
arise concerning the Constitution and laws of the United States, in
suits pending in the state courts, and as citizens of other states may be
sued as defendants in those courts, and as the judicial power of the
United States extends to such controversies, unless there-is a right of
appeal and removal there is no way in which that judicial power can
reach such cases: The argument rests therefore almost entirely on the
assumed necessity of such right, in order to give effect to the grants of
judicial power. Powerful arguments have certainly been made against
the existence of the right in any case. These have been drawn from
thbe acknowledged independence and sovereignty of the state and Federal governments, each within its own sphere, which doctrine has often
been asserted by the Supreme Court of the United States. They have
expressly told us that the separation of the two governments is so complete that Congress can vest no part of the judicial power of the United
States in any state court, and can impose no duty whatever on any state
officer. In view of these conclusions it is certainly difficult to show, by
any satisfactory reasoning, by what authority Congress can authorize a
Federal court to acquire original jurisdiction through the process and
proceedings of a state court. These considerations, joined with the fact
that by the ordinary rules of interpretation the general grants of judicial
power, original and appellate, in the Constitution of the United States,
would, in the absence of any professed intention on its face to regulate
any other judicial system, be held to relate solely to the judicial system
established by itself, have led many able minds to deny the existence
of any power whatever to transfer a case by appeal or otherwise from a
state to a Federal court. But against these arguments the power has
been upheld, as already remarked, upon the ground of its absolute
necessity, in order to give effect to the grants of judicial power. But
if the power rests upon that ground, the necessity which gives it birth
would seem to constitute its limit.
And in respect to a non-resident plaintiff, who voluntarily brings his
suit in a state court, that necessity fails entirely. A right of removal is
not necessary there, to enable the judicial power of the United States
to reach the case, because he might have brought the suit in the Federal
court in the first instance.
The constitutional grant had full effect from the outset, and the party
in whose behalf the right to have the case tried in the Federal court is
claimed, had it fully provided for him. Whether after he voluntarily
waived it and sued in the state court, there is any power to provide for
a removal of the suit in his favor, is certainly a different question from
any that has been yet decided by the Supreme Court of the United
States. There is at least some ground for denying the power in such a
case, without impeaching the right of appeal and removal so far as they
have already been sustained. Whether upon full examination this
ground would be found sufficient, I shall not attempt further to inquire.
But I will say that if this act is to have the *effect claimed for it, if after

